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The world faces a worsening public health crisis: A growing
number of bacteria are resistant to available antibiotics. Yet there are few
new antibiotics in the development pipeline to take the place of these
increasingly ineffective drugs. We review a number of proposals intended
to bolster drug development, including such financial incentives for
pharmaceutical manufacturers as extending the effective patent life for
new antibiotics. However, such strategies directly conflict with the clear
need to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescriptions and could actually
increase prescription use. As an alternative, we recommend a two-prong,
“integrated” strategy. This would increase reimbursement for the
appropriate, evidence-based use of antibiotics that also met specific public
health goals—such as reducing illness levels while limiting antibiotic
resistance.
ABSTRACT

R

ising rates of antibiotic resistance
have become a clear public health
crisis.1 The trend is not limited to
the United States but is a worldwide problem—so much so that
the World Health Organization considers antibiotic resistance an emerging threat to global
stability.2
The issue captured headlines in 2007 when
Andrew Speaker, a U.S. attorney who flew to
Europe for his wedding and honeymoon, potentially exposed hundreds of international travelers to extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis.
That form of TB is resistant to first- and secondline drugs.3
Over the past two decades, hospitals and other
health care institutions have reported more infections that are not treatable by standard therapies.4,5 Community-acquired infections have also
demonstrated escalating patterns of antibiotic
resistance. For example, the frequency of community-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus increased more than sevenfold
from 1999 to 2006.6
Resistant microorganisms have implications
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for individual patients as well as for health care
systems. Patients who acquire such infections
are at increased risk for death and disease.6 Such
patients can more than double inpatient hospital
costs7 and account for increased outpatient treatment costs8 and spending on long-term care.9
In recent years, a call to arms has arisen from
physicians,10 public health organizations, governments, and leading academic groups such
as the Infectious Diseases Society of America11
and the Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics.12 Many proposals being offered to address the issue of increasing antibiotic resistance
emphasize the need for additional incentives to
develop new generations of more powerful drugs.
In this paper we review the proposals. We also
argue that without an integrated focus on both
producing new drugs and making careful and
more limited use of existing ones—a strategy
called “conservation”—the world will not be able
to develop drugs fast enough to get ahead of the
resistance problem. We propose that one effective way to achieve this focus would be to tie
reimbursement for antibiotics more directly to
September 2010
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objective evidence of appropriate prescription
rates and positive public health outcomes.

Background: The Problem Of
Antibiotic Resistance
When penicillin was first used in the United
States in 1942, physicians were optimistic about
the ability of modern medicine to defeat deadly
microorganisms.13 However, shortly after that
came the first report of penicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus.14 Since then, researchers have
uncovered many biological bases for resistance
to antibiotics, including naturally selected genetic mutations in bacteria, the passage of mutations between species, and the decrease in
nonpathogenic species of bacteria that allowed
deadly microorganisms to flourish.15
Societal factors accelerate the spread of resistance. Undertreatment through suboptimal
doses or inadequate treatment durations—for
example, when a patient does not complete a
prescribed course of antibiotics—leads to resistant strains of disease-causing microorganisms.
Resistance is also encouraged by unnecessary
treatment of viral or noninfectious diseases with
antibiotics and the use of broad-spectrum drugs
in patients whose infections could be treated
with more-targeted drugs.
The misuse of antibiotics in these ways is unfortunately common. Physicians may not be
aware of or adhere to clinical practice guidelines
for the proper use of drugs.16,17 Patient factors,
such as demand for antibiotics in inappropriate
clinical situations, contribute to the use of
unnecessary prescriptions.18
Pharmaceutical manufacturers also play a
role, through marketing campaigns aimed at increasing sales. For example, in 2005 Pfizer was
warned by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) that its “misleading promotion” of
linezolid (Zyvox) as a treatment for a wide range
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) infections “poses serious public health
and safety concerns because of its potential to
result in inappropriate use.” The FDA concluded
that the clinical trial data did not support
linezolid’s use for those conditions.19
Separately, Pfizer has settled a case in which it
was charged with promoting the use of the macrolide antibiotic azithromycin (Zithromax) to
treat types of infections for which the drug
was known to have limited efficacy. Court documents alleged that the company’s motivation
was to “keep sales for Zithromax consistent over
the year.”20
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Efforts To Control Antibiotic
Resistance
As resistance rates among microorganisms have
risen, so have concerns about whether enough
new antibiotics are being developed. The Infectious Diseases Society of America reported that
the largest pharmaceutical companies produced
only five systemic antibacterial agents during
2003–7.21 FDA approvals in general have declined in recent years, but given that resistance
is a more acute public health threat for infectious
diseases than for other medical conditions, a
vibrant pipeline of new antibiotics may be more
critical than the pipeline of other drugs—such as
a new proton-pump inhibitor for acid reflux, or
another statin to treat elevated cholesterol.
One industry leader has argued that antibiotic
development has slowed because the “low-hanging fruit” has already been picked, and moresubstantial investment is required to develop
the next generation of products.22 And in fact,
pharmaceutical research and development is dominated by for-profit companies, which are
likely to set investment priorities on the basis
of projected revenues, rather than perceived
public health needs.23 The major problem in this
case is that the development of antibiotics is not
well reimbursed relative to that of other drugs,
such as treatments for cancer.24 There is no substantial investment in developing new antibiotics because companies don’t expect them to
produce a substantial rate of return.25
Numerous strategies have been suggested to
address rising antibiotic resistance and a limited
development pipeline. The three main categories
of such strategies are conserving the effectiveness of existing antibiotic drugs, providing additional financial incentives to encourage drug
development, and reducing the drug development costs.

Antibiotic Conservation: Infection
Control And Rational Use
The most widely employed methods of conservation are improved environmental infection control and rational prescription practices. In terms
of environmental infection control, routine
hand washing in an intensive care setting has
been shown to reduce rates of vancomycinresistant Enterococcus (VRE), a bacterium that
can cause deadly blood infections.26 In some
well-regulated environments, rigorous infection
control has successfully limited antibiotic resistance.27 A recent report suggests that hospitalbased conservation efforts in the United States
have reduced the incidence of certain methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections.28
Encouraging the rational use of antibiotics
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often entails active supervision of physicians’
prescribing practices. Such programs include educating physicians about evidence-based prescribing practices, known as “academic
detailing”;29 the development of treatment
guidelines;30 and restrictions that exclude certain antibiotics from clinical use or require prior
authorization for their use. Rational-use programs impose increased requirements on specialists in infectious diseases but can still be
cost-effective and lead to positive public health
outcomes. In the decentralized U.S. system, individual institutions may be reluctant to invest in
societally advantageous programs because some
of the benefits would inevitably accrue to unaffiliated neighboring institutions, perhaps direct
competitors.
Experience has also shown that both infection
control and rational prescription practices have
important limitations. Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus has passed between patients isolated in different rooms or areas of a
hospital.32 In the United States, the varying levels
of commitment to conservation on the part of
hospitals and other health care institutions can
also limit the strategy’s overall effectiveness. Notably, infection control measures are generally
not reimbursed. To the degree that institutions
have financial inducements to engage in infection control, these are largely punitive and occur
after the fact, instead of being positive incentives
to support infection control ahead of time.
Under recent Medicare guidelines, for example,
hospitals will be assessed a financial penalty for
inpatients who acquire certain catheter-associated infections, whether or not the infection was
avoidable.33

Supply-Side Incentives For New Drug
Development
Policy makers have sought to address rising antibiotic resistance by proposing additional financial incentives for drug manufacturers.
Patent Term Extension One proposal is to
extend the period of effective patent life granted
to new antibiotics. Drug patents have a statutory
lifetime of twenty years, but the effective patent
length is shorter because of the amount of time
the drug approval process takes.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has suggested that patents could be
lengthened “to 25 or 30 years” for important
antibiotics with “high therapeutic potential.”34
Others have argued for starting the patent period
when regulatory approval is granted,35 or extending antibiotic patents for even longer periods.36,37
Longer patent terms would give sponsors
more time in which to earn revenues. But the

real benefits would not accrue until after the
current twenty-year patent term ends, which limits the impact of the extra time on a company’s
bottom line in the present.38 Many other troublesome questions are also raised by the idea of
extending the patent term, including the difficulty of modifying patent law for a discrete sector
such as antimicrobials without creating unanticipated effects in other drug classes.
Linking Antibiotic Development To Other
Rights Another alternative involves linking antibiotic development to supplementary market exclusivity rights that could be transferred to other
drugs, also known as “wildcard patents.” For
example, if Pfizer developed a new antibiotic,
the FDA might grant six months of market exclusivity that Pfizer could apply instead to its
blockbuster cholesterol-lowering drug atorvastatin (Lipitor), whose U.S. market exclusivity
is scheduled to expire in 2011. An analysis by
Kevin Outterson and others estimated that ten
wildcard patents could cost as much as $40 billion.38 An expenditure of this magnitude, however, is likely to be wasteful and would act as a
hidden tax on common conditions such as high
cholesterol. Shifting funds among disease categories in a haphazard fashion, detached from
market signals, might hurt more patients than
the strategy would help.38,39
Other Incentives Finally, some “supply side”
proposals focus on non-patent-related incentives.
▸▸ ORPHAN DRUG ACT : The Orphan Drug Act of
1983 encourages research into therapeutic
agents for rare conditions and gives manufacturers federal funding and research tax credits,
as well as enhanced market exclusivity rights. In
recent legislation, Congress asked the FDA to
study how the act might be applied to antibiotics
developed to treat “serious and life threatening
infectious diseases” caused by “antibiotic-resistant bacteria.”40 But many antibiotics and other
antimicrobials have already received orphan
drug designation, so it is not clear how much
extending the law would accomplish.
▸▸ PRIZES AND BUYOUTS : Other analysts and
academics have recommended using a prize to
encourage research in this area. The public
health payoff would come when the ultimate
product was dissociated from the patent system
and entered the public domain, where it could be
sold more cheaply.41 Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
recently proposed an $80 billion prize fund to
encourage research, although the plan did not
receive much further attention in the Senate.42
Similar to a prize would be offering generous
patent buyouts. A patent buyout involves purchasing the patent and marketing exclusivity
rights and offering open, nonexclusive, noSeptember 2010
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royalty licenses as necessary. The “first in class”
drugs developed could then be held in a “strategic antibiotic reserve” and saved for future
crises.43
Prize proposals face financing and implementation barriers. However, they may represent a
substantial evolution in the thinking behind
global pharmaceutical development, especially
for fighting high-priority disease-causing microorganisms and where existing drug development
pipelines are weak.44

Current programs for
antibiotic conservation
and production work
at cross-purposes to
each other.

Reducing Drug Development Costs
A third category of proposals seeks to reduce the
investment expense of creating a new antibiotic.
One way of achieving such a goal is through
increasing public or nonprofit funding of basic
research on infectious diseases. The Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, funds
research on the basic biology of tuberculosis45
and how to manage the increase of extensively
drug-resistant tuberculosis.46 However, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) spends only
about $200 million per year on such “upstream”
antimicrobial resistance–related research.47 Sustained increases in basic research budgets would
benefit “downstream” research and ultimately
the public’s health. Investment at this level could
be more cost-effective than extensive changes in
patent law—for example, if a new receptor or
mechanism is discovered that serves as the basis
for numerous subsequent products. Still, the
need to incentivize involvement of “downstream” pharmaceutical manufacturers would
remain.
Another way to affect development costs is by
adjusting certain regulatory standards. Antibiotics are usually tested against a control drug
known to be effective against the bacterium in
question, to demonstrate that the experimental
antibiotic is not inferior to the standard treatment. Such “non-inferiority” trials can be complicated for investigators to design, and
achieving useful results often requires enrolling
more patients and investing additional time and
money than would be required in a placebocontrolled trial. Therefore, industry sources
have pointed out that relaxing benchmarks for
statistical significance in these trials could cut
development costs.48
Short of major changes in regulatory standards, some proactive steps can be taken to
streamline the regulatory process, including
publishing guidelines to reduce uncertainty
about FDA expectations for clinical trials and
actively working with drug developers early in
the process to provide feedback about implementing these recommendations.49 The Infec1692
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tious Diseases Society of America and the FDA
recently held a joint meeting to consider guidelines for developing new antibiotics to treat
pneumonia. Creating such guidelines for emerging infectious disease threats could help make
the regulatory process for potential antibiotic
sponsors more transparent.50
However, adjusting the regulatory process
may not have much of an effect. Historically,
approved antibiotics have had among the shortest clinical development times of any drug
class.51 There may also be important disadvantages to loosening regulatory requirements, as
reduced premarket testing may lead to an increased risk of the emergence of dangerous side
effects after approval.52
For the most important antibiotics, it may be
worth taking these additional risks, but the relaxation of premarketing hurdles would require
careful surveillance of drug safety after FDA approval. Although currently in development, effective systems for postmarketing surveillance
have not yet been implemented.

An Integrated Response To The
Antibiotic Resistance Crisis
One of the primary themes to emerge from the
efforts to address growing antibiotic resistance
is that current programs for antibiotic conservation and production work at cross-purposes to
each other. The growing popularity of infection
control and limits on antibiotic use contributes
to depressed sales of new products. Depressed
sales in turn have prompted large pharmaceutical manufacturers to abandon new antibiotic
research.
However, supply-side incentives—particularly
those that provide longer periods of market exclusivity or allow drugs to come to market
sooner—do not directly address bacterial resistance. Because future spending on pharmaceutical products is unpredictable, patent owners
may choose to maximize short-term revenues,
wasting antibiotic resources. For example, they

Incentives that
include public health
goals are essential to
avoiding unintended
consequences and the
misuse of antibiotics.

ated medications available for Alzheimer’s disease and concluded that the evidence did not
justify their cost and widespread use.54 Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme has many
years of experience in evaluating populationlevel reimbursement based on health impact.55
We envision a similar system for evaluating
antibiotic effectiveness and providing fair payments for societal benefit. The resulting dramatic increases in antibiotic reimbursement
would jump-start innovation for new antibiotics.

Conservation-Based Market
Exclusivity
may encourage the broad use of an antibiotic so
they can sell more of the drug. If there are other
manufacturers with antibiotics in the same class,
this anticonservation pressure will spread to
those competitors. The damage in terms of resistance may then be even more acute, because
bacteria may develop cross-resistance among
drugs with similar mechanisms of action.

Value-Based Reimbursement
A more rational incentive structure would promote conservation while creating a viable market
for investment in antibiotic research and development. In the United States, antibiotics have
traditionally been low-price products.53 The societal value of activities such as hospital infection
control programs greatly exceeds the value
placed on them by private-sector and government payers. We suggest applying the principles
of value-based reimbursement to paying for continued antibiotic effectiveness.
Take, for example, a new drug, or a conservation program for an existing drug, that treats or
reduces vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus and
leads to fewer intensive care unit admissions
for patients with this infection. A value-based
reimbursement plan would allow part of the savings to be shared with the manufacturer of the
product and with the hospital that put the infection control program in place. Under such a proposal, the combined increase in antibiotic
reimbursement should be substantial—amounting to at least several billion dollars a year. This
approach would close some of the gap between
the private cost and societal value of antibiotics.
Linking potential revenues to the appropriate
use of a product has more and more precedents
in pharmaceutical markets. In some markets,
government-related expert bodies make valuebased assessments of available medical technology. England’s National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence, for example, recently evalu-

As we have noted, the current market exclusivity
system can contribute to misuse of new antibiotics because manufacturers earn revenue by
encouraging the widespread use of their products before their patents expire. Many proposals
to increase market exclusivity to spur drug research and development do not address this
problem sufficiently.
As an alternative, we suggest a conservationbased market exclusivity strategy, whereby the
FDA would set specific effectiveness targets for
each antibiotic. Just as the FDA consults with
expert advisory committees on the approval of
new drugs, it could consult with appropriate experts from the NIH and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). Ideally, these experts would be free from substantial conflicts of
interest.
In the deliberations, factors such as disease
morbidity, the effectiveness of current treatment
strategies, and the rate of emerging resistance
would be used to set the public health goals. If the
observed data met the target and equitable access
to the drug was observed, the company would
continue to enjoy marketing exclusivity. For example, for a drug developed to treat vancomycinresistant Enterococcus, the target could be lower
resistance rates or reduced morbidity from related illness in a sample of U.S. health care institutions.
Certainly, this strategy would require additional investment in improved surveillance of
antibiotic use and development of resistance.
Some of the proposed objective criteria for
assessing proper antibiotic use may be unpredictable. For example, resistance may emerge
at a more accelerated rate than anticipated.
But, as with any regulatory function, there
should be some flexibility, and the manufacturer
should be given the opportunity to explain its
results to the oversight committee. If the marketing practices and usage patterns are appropriate,
then the manufacturer could retain market exclusivity. This flexibility should increase the apSeptember 2010
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peal of this scheme to participating pharmaceutical companies.
Finally, because resistance can cross species
and diminish the effectiveness of antibiotics
both within and across classes of drugs, the implementation of this program would be improved if the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice permitted manufacturers to coordinate the marketing, sale, and
proper use of important antibiotics.

Conclusion
As microorganisms resistant to available therapies continue to emerge, there is concern from
many sides that the current supply of antibiotics
is not sufficient to meet the growing demand.
Most proposed solutions provide additional incentives to encourage investment by pharmaceutical manufacturers. Few of the proposals
take into account the fact that the profit-making
incentives of manufacturers can be at odds with
public health programs intended to limit antibiotic use and limit resistance.
As an alternative, we have outlined a way to
better align manufacturer and public health inThis paper was supported by a grant
from Resources for the Future, a
nonprofit organization funded by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Aaron
Kesselheim is supported by a career
development award from the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality
(K08HS18465-01) and a Robert Wood

centives. Enhanced reimbursement for antibiotics commensurate with their societal value,
along with market exclusivity tied to clinically
rational use of the drugs, would allow everyone
to benefit from the use of the antibiotics in situations most likely to reduce deaths caused by
infection.
These programs would also encourage manufacturers to create programs to restrict clinically
inappropriate use of their products, such as cooperating with—and funding—hospital-based
infection control efforts. At the same time, enhanced public investment in resistance research
could improve knowledge about drug targets and
foster more development of antibiotics. For
drugs that ultimately emerge from public investment programs, the government should receive
an appropriate share of the enhanced reimbursement by payers.
Incentives that include public health goals are
essential to avoiding the various unintended
consequences and the misuse that have frequently characterized the market for antibiotics.
The same incentives may offer legitimate hope
for addressing the growing public health crisis
posed by antibiotic resistance. ▪
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